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ABSTRACT
Modern ransomware often generate and manage cryptographic
keys on the victim’s machine, giving defenders an opportunity to
capture exposed keys and recover encrypted data without paying
the ransom. However, recent work has raised the possibility of
future enclave-enhanced malware that could avoid such mitigations
using emerging support for hardware-enforced secure enclaves in
commodity CPUs. Nonetheless, the practicality of such enclave-
enhanced malware and its potential impact on all phases of the
ransomware lifecyle remain unclear. Given the demonstrated capac-
ity of ransomware authors to innovate in order to better extort their
victims (e.g. through the adoption of untraceable virtual currencies
and anonymity networks), it is important to better understand the
risks involved and identify potential mitigations.
As a basis for comprehensive security and performance analysis
of enclave-enhanced ransomware, we present RansomClave, a
family of ransomware that securely manage their cryptographic
keys using an enclave. We use RansomClave to explore the impli-
cations of enclave-enhanced ransomware for the key generation,
encryption and key release phases of the ransomware lifecycle, and
to identify potential limitations and mitigations.
We propose two plausible victim models and analyse, from an at-
tacker’s perspective, how RansomClave can protect cryptographic
keys from each type of victim. We find that some existing miti-
gations are likely to be effective during the key generation and
encryption phases, but that RansomClave enables new trustless
key release schemes that could potentially improve attacker’s prof-
itability and, by extension, make enclaves an attractive target for
future attackers.
1 INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, ransomware has become one of the more
prominent cyber-security threats against individuals and organisa-
tions [28]. Ransomware is a malware that either renders a victim’s
computer resources (locker-ransomware) or valuable data (crypto-
ransomware) unusable [36]. Crypto-ransomware is currently the
most common of the two, and is especially difficult to defend against
since victims are required to obtain the corresponding decryption
key to access their data (assuming no backup is available).
A typical ransomware attack lifecycle goes through four main
phases: installation, unique public/private key generation, encryp-
tion (with symmetric keys), and extortion/private key release. For
a successful operation, the private key created in the second phase
needs to be securely stored and only released in the last phase
once the victim has paid the ransom [1, 33]. Previous work has
shown several weaknesses in existing ransomware cryptographic
key management systems [6, 8, 19, 23]. For example, many ran-
somware variants (e.g., DMA Locker, Locky, Cerber, WannaCry,
NotPetya, and BadRabbit) generate and store cryptographic keys
(both asymmetric and symmetric ones) in untrusted memory on the
victim’s machine before permanently deleting them. Fortunately,
victims can exploit such weaknesses to extract the generated keys
using memory forensics techniques [37] and tools like Dumpit,
RAMCapturer and FTK imager [57]. Additionally, researchers have
developed techniques, e.g. PayBreak [31], to capture keys generated
at run-time.
Unfortunately, emerging technology could render some of these
mitigations ineffective. As recent work has observed [38], ran-
somware authors share many of the challenges faced by confidential
cloud computing [49], which seeks to protect applications deployed
on remote cloud infrastructure from a malicious cloud provider.
To solve these challenges, confidential cloud computing leverages
emerging support on commodity hardware for trusted execution en-
vironments (TEEs), such as Intel SGX [16, 41]. SGX TEEs, commonly
known as enclaves, allow parts of an application to be executed
securely irrespective of the rest of the system [49]. As has been
shown, it is also possible for malware to hide malicious activities
within enclaves to evade anti-virus systems [38]. However, previous
studies have not considered the impact of enclaves on the complete
lifecycle of ransomware cryptographic key management, and the
practicality and performance overhead of such a ransomware vari-
ant is unclear. Given the damage ransomware causes, it is important
to understand what new advantages such ransomware might pro-
vide to attackers, whether anti-malware mechanisms in existing
enclave technology are robust against them, and whether additional
anti-ransomware mitigations might be required.
We perform an in-depth study of the potential implications
of enclave-enabled ransomware using RansomClave, a proof-of-
concept family of ransomware variants that leverages SGX to man-
age ransomware cryptographic keys on a victim’s machine. Ran-
somClave, once executed, creates an enclave that it uses to securely
generate asymmetric key pairs. RansomClave releases the private
key only when a ransom payment transaction from the Bitcoin
blockchain is verified by the enclave.
In contrast to previous work, we analyse the security and prac-
ticality of RansomClave with respect to all phases of the ran-
somware lifecycle. During the key generation and encryption phases,
we show that there is a design-space whereby to avoid triggering
network monitoring software a ransomware author may skip SGX
remote attestation and avoid command and control (C2) server
communication before encryption completes, but that this prevents
dynamic loading of encrypted ransomware code to the enclave.
Similarly, during the key release phase, we use RansomClave to
show that enclaves open up a design-space of new key release
schemes, each with different trade-offs for the attacker between
security, reliability, and operational overhead. Of particular concern
are fully autonomous or trustless key release schemes, which do
not require the victim to trust the attacker to release the decryption
key after a ransom is paid. This guarantee could increase a victim’s
willingness to pay a ransom and by extension attacker profitability.
Contributions. In summary, this paper makes the following
contributions:
(1) We analyse keymanagement schemes of existing ransomware
variants and, based on our findings, derive requirements for
a successful attack (§3).
(2) We introduce RansomClave, a proof-of-concept SGX-based
ransomware that generates keys in an enclave to protect
them from disclosure (§5), and analyse its performance.
(3) We propose three blockchain-based RansomClave key re-
lease schemes and showhow avoiding interactionwith the at-
tacker post-infection could potentially make the ransomware
operation more profitable for attackers (§6).
(4) We analyse mitigations to defend against SGX-based ran-
somware attacks (§8).
2 BACKGROUND
This section provides background on ransomware encryption mech-
anisms, and a summary of relevant features of Intel SGX.
Ransomware Encryption Schemes.Modern ransomware are of-
ten classified into three types based on the type of encryption
employed. Symmetric encryption ransomware uses one key for both
encryption and decryption and allows faster file encryption, result-
ing in shorter time to complete the attack. This also reduces the
chances of the attack being discovered by requiring less processing
power for computations. Asymmetric encryption ransomware uses
asymmetric cryptography, with the public key used to encrypt files
and the associated private master key to decrypt them. The encryp-
tion process is a resource-intensive task and slower in comparison
to symmetric key encryption due to the overhead of public-key
encryption. However, it is more secure since the encryption pro-
cess can be completed using only the public key thus allowing the
private key to be kept secret. Finally, hybrid encryption ransomware
incorporates both symmetric encryption and asymmetric encryp-
tion. It uses symmetric encryption to encrypt the user files quickly.
The symmetric key is then encrypted using asymmetric encryption.
Hybrid encryption is often used by newer strains of ransomware,
and reaps the benefits of both symmetric encryption (speed) and
asymmetric encryption (security) [9, 30].
Intel SGX. Intel SGX is a security enhancement to recent Intel
CPUs that provides a trusted execution environment (TEE). SGX
TEEs, known as enclaves, protect the integrity and confidentiality
of applications handling sensitive data such as cryptographic keys.
The SGX architecture enables an application to instantiate one or
more enclaves such that enclave code and data is protected from
the OS and hypervisor [16, 54], and even from an attacker with
physical access to the victim’s computer [39].
Enclave code must execute in user space, and is not able to exe-
cute system calls or access secure peripherals. As such, applications
are divided into two parts, a protected enclave (trusted code) and an
unprotected part (untrusted code) which handles communication
between the OS and enclave. The processor transparently encrypts
and integrity protects enclave data whenever it leaves the CPU. The
Intel SGX SDK provides a function call-like abstraction for entering
and exiting an enclave. Calls into the enclave are referred to as
ECALLs (enclave entry call), and calls from the enclave to outside
as OCALLs (outside call) [15, 39, 52].
The SGX architecture includes a sealing capability, which allows
data to be stored on persistent storage in an encrypted form. The
sealing key is generated using a Key Derivation Function (KDF)
[15] from the embedded base data seal key, which is fused into
each processor during manufacturing by Intel. The sealing key is
provided by the processor to the enclave, and only the enclave
that sealed the data can later unseal it. SGX also supports remote
attestation to allow a remote party to verify an enclave and establish
a secure channel to it. To launch a production enclave in SGX
version 1 (SGXv1), SGX required either the enclave binary or its
author to be registered with Intel. In SGXv2, Intel added a flexible
launch control capability, allowing the platform owner to bypass
Intel as an intermediary in the enclave launch process [26, 51].
3 RANSOMWARE KEY MANAGEMENT
In this section, we discuss how ransomware key management
schemes have evolved over the years. We then analyse the weak-
nesses of existing schemes in the face of modern anti-ransomware
techniques, and propose five requirements of an attacker for a ran-
somware design. Notation used in our analysis and the remainder of
the paper is as follows: (i) AKprv (attacker’s private key); (ii) AKpub
(attacker’s public key); (iii) VKprv (victim specific private key); (iv)
VKpub (victim specific public key); (v) EKv (f ) /EKv (symmetric key
for victim v’s file f — index f omitted where not relevant); (vi)
nonce (pseudo-random number).
3.1 The Evolution of Ransomware Key
Management
At the heart of any ransomware operation lies key management: if
poorly implemented, it can potentially leak encryption keys to the
victim and threaten the entire campaign [14]. Table 1 summarises
our analysis of key management schemes in some of the most
prevalent ransomware families. Our analysis extends several previ-
ous analyses [8, 23, 58], in particular, we also show existing core
ransomware functionalities and match them against a set of require-
ments (formally defined in §3.2) that must be met by ransomware
variants.
Our research shows that the majority (60%) of ransomware vari-
ants rely on an active Internet connection on the victim’s machine
to exchange keys with a command-and-control (C2) server [6, 8].
Additionally, 40% of ransomware variants (e.g.,WannaCry) generate
keys on a victim’s untrusted machine, thus leaving them exposed
and vulnerable to recovery [8, 23]. Older strains of ransomware,





RQ1 RQ2 RQ3 RQ4 RQ5
Apocalypse 2016 ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
Jigsaw 2016 ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗Symmetric
Razy 2016 ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
CryptoLocker 2014 ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
CBT-Locker 2014 ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
CryptoDefense 2015 ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗Asymmetric
PetrWrap 2016 ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
Unlock92 2016 ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
CryptoWall 2014 ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
TorrentLocker 2014 ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
TeslaCrypt 2015 ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
Cerber 2016 ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗
Locky 2016 ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗Hybrid
Petya 2016 ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
RYUK 2017 ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
WannaCry 2018 ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
EKING 2020 ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
TEE RansomClave 2021 ✓ ✓ ✓* ✓ ✓
* Only in proactive variant
such as Apocalypse and CryptoLocker, use either symmetric key
or asymmetric key encryption. Newer strains, such as CryptoWall,
TeslaCrypt, WannaCry and RYUK often opt for a hybrid encryption
method. As Figure 1 shows, there are three variants, V1 , V2 , and V3
for key generation. In V1 , ransomware, once executed ( 1○), gener-
ates VKprv and VKpub locally on the victim’s machine while sending
the VKprv to the attacker’s C2 server. In V2 , the ransomware gener-




























































Figure 1: Current key management process of a typical ran-
somware
machine while safely storing the VKprv . A unique EKv is gener-
ated for each victim file to be encrypted ( 2○), and all EKv are then
encrypted with the VKpub ( 3○).
3.2 Ransomware Key Management
Requirements
We define a set of desirable requirements from an attacker’s per-
spective that modern ransomware must fulfil to achieve its primary
goal successfully, i.e. encrypt victim’s data, secure the VKprv and
hold the data hostage until the ransom is paid. As we will see how-
ever, some of these requirements are potentially in conflict with
each other.
RQ1: Secure asymmetric key generation.Ransomwaremust en-
sure that the VKprv needed to decrypt individual EKv is not exposed
to the victim at any point before the ransom is paid. Many attackers
prefer setting up their own trusted C2 server to generate, distribute
and securely store VKprv as it provides some measure of protection
against the arbitrary key recovery. However, this setup requires
an outbound connection before beginning the encryption process
[6, 18], which could be blocked/inspected by network monitoring
tools [17, 42]. In addition, if the server’s location is compromised,
it could potentially be taken down by law enforcement [47], thus
exposing VKprv [40].
RQ2:Uniquekeyper victim.Ransomwaremust generate a unique
VKprv for each victim to maximise the ransom payment received
from victims. Some attackers deploy ransomware V3 , such as IEn-
crypt, with an embedded VKpub to eliminate outbound connections.
However, using one global VKprv could lead to victims collaborating
and sharing the master key [45].
RQ3: Secure symmetric key generation. Ransomware in a hy-
brid encryption setting must ensure that the unique EKv used to
encrypt each victim file are not exposed to the victim at any point.
RQ4:Nopost-exploitation connections.To evade networkmon-
itoring software, Ransomware must avoid outbound connections
to a C2 to retrieve the private keys or payload, or to an attestation
service, until the victim’s files have been encrypted.
RQ5: Trustworthy key release. Ransomware must employ a se-
cure and reliable key release scheme post-attack to incentivise vic-
tims to co-operate and pay the requested ransom [12]. The scheme
should also avoid unnecessary operational overhead for the attacker
(e.g. to maintain an online presence, or manage large numbers of
decryption keys). Some attackers request victims to send the en-
crypted VKprv along with the ransom payment to avoid exposing
the AKprv . However, keys are still generated on the victim’s ma-
chine leaving them vulnerable.
4 THREAT MODEL
In our threat model we assume the malware distribution and in-
stallation stages have been successfully performed. We assume the
ransomware has the appropriate privilege to start enclaves and
issue syscalls. We assume that the victim’s machine supports Intel
SGX and the SGX feature is enabled. We revisit the plausibility of
these assumptions in our discussion of mitigations in §8.
We consider two different types of target systems: (i) standard
system equipped with an AV, however, lacking any specific anti-
ransomware functionality; (ii) advanced system equipped with an
up-to-date AV that also includes an anti-ransomware module and
can also capture cryptographic keys generated locally (e.g., Pay-
Break). In all cases, we assume that a victim cannot break the
hardware-enforced security of SGX to obtain enclave-specific keys
(e.g., sealing keys). We also assume that Intel would not release the
key embedded into each processor during the manufacturing of the
SGX-capable CPU [2].
5 RANSOMCLAVE KEY GENERATION AND
ENCRYPTION
As a basis for security and performance analysis of enclave-enhanced
ransomware, we present RansomClave, a family of ransomware
that securely manage their cryptographic keys using an enclave.
In this section we describe RansomClave’s key generation and
encryption phase, and how conflicts between the requirements in-
troduced in §3.2 motivate two different RansomClave variants. We








































Figure 2: Key management and execution flow of Ransom-
Clave (steps 7○- 8○ shown for reactive RansomClave)
RansomClave’s key generation and encryption can be split
into two stages. The first stage, asymmetric key generation (Fig-
ure 2, steps 1○- 5○), is common to both RansomClave variants. The
second stage, symmetric key generation and encryption, differs
between variants (Figure 2, steps 7○- 8○).
5.1 Asymmetric Key Generation
As shown in Figure 2, the RansomClave malware consists of both
untrusted code (host application) and trusted code (enclave). Ran-
somClave asymmetric key generation happens primarily inside the
enclave. Once the malicious payload is executed, RansomClave’s
untrusted code creates the enclave 1○. The untrusted code then
performs an ECALL to enter the enclave and initiate key genera-
tion and encryption 2○. On entering the enclave for the first time,
RansomClave generates a victim specific asymmetric key pair
(𝑉𝐾𝑝𝑟𝑣,𝑉𝐾𝑝𝑢𝑏 ) 3○. RansomClave then creates an enclave-specific
seal key using the EGETKEY instruction, and seals VKprv using the
seal key 4○. Finally, the enclave performs an OCALL to send the
unique VKpub and sealed VKprv to untrusted code 5○. Both keys
are then stored outside the enclave on the victim’s system.
5.2 Symmetric Key Generation and Encryption
RansomClave’s symmetric key generation and encryption stage
is similar to other modern ransomware that use a hybrid scheme
for improved performance. However, we introduce two different
RansomClave variants for managing symmetric keys, reactive and
proactive, each focused on the capabilities of the target system.
Reactive RansomClave: This variant generates symmetric keys
and encrypts the victim’s files outside the enclave. It targets a reac-
tive victim who is unlikely to detect the ransomware and capture
symmetric keys exposed in untrusted memory (RQ3) before en-
cryption completes. However, encrypting files outside the enclave
avoids additional data movement overheads, allowing encryption
to complete more quickly and thus serving as a baseline for perfor-
mance comparison with other variants.
Figure 2 shows the untrusted code generating a unique 256-bit
AES symmetric key (EKv (f ) ) for each file f before the encryption
process starts ( 7○). After encryption of file f completes, each EKv (f )
is encrypted using VKpub ( 8○) and then the plaintext EKv (f ) is
deleted. Only the encrypted version of EKv (f ) remains after the
encryption process. Steps ( 7○) and ( 8○) repeat until all the victim
files have been encrypted. The benefit of using per-file symmetric
encryption keys is that the EKv (f ) for files already encrypted will
not be recoverable (since the original EKv is deleted after encrypting
each file) even if the ransomware attack is discovered and stopped
mid-execution.
Proactive RansomClave: This variant assumes a proactive vic-
tim who is vigilant and potentially able to start capturing crypto-
graphic keys soon after the ransomware is executed [19] It gener-
ates VKprv , VKpub and each EKv (f ) inside the enclave. In addition,
the ransomware also encrypts each victim file inside the enclave.
By generating the EKv and encrypting files inside an enclave, the
proactive variant mitigates some of the security weaknesses of the
reactive variant, i.e. exposure of the EKv in memory (RQ3)
Although the proactive variant comes closer to meeting RQ3, we
note that by default SGX does not provide confidentiality to enclave
code. As a result, a proactive victim with sufficiently advanced AV
could inspect the malware code and detect RansomClave given
an appropriate signature. Although an additional RansomClave
variant with private dynamic code loading is possible [53], it would
need to communicate with a C2 server to download an encrypted
malicious payload (violating RQ4). For similar reasons, we do not
consider using remote attestation to verify the enclave.
Another potential drawback of the proactive variant is its per-
formance, since it must transfer victim files to the enclave from
the host file system. Performing file related system calls from the
enclave requires additional costly enclave transitions, potentially
slowing the overall encryption process and jeopardising the at-
tacker’s primary goal of holding the victim’s data hostage quickly.
However, previous work has shown that asynchronous system calls
can be used to mask much of this overhead [4]. We evaluate the
overhead of the proactive variant with this optimization in §7.
6 RANSOMCLAVE KEY RELEASE
Once RansomClave has successfully encrypted the victim’s files
and presented the victim with a ransom note, the next phase of its
operation is key release. As discussed in §3.1, existing key release
schemes introduce additional security risks and operational over-
head for the attacker. Furthermore, they require the victim to trust
the attacker to release the decryption key after a ransom is paid.
In this section we show how RansomClave enables more robust
key release schemes in comparison to existing ransomware.We next
explore three alternative RansomClave key release schemes, each
providing different trade-offs between the security of the scheme,
the operational overhead of the attacker for managing decryption
keys, and the likelihood the victim will pay the ransom1.
6.1 Blockchain with Online Attacker
Our first RansomClave key release scheme leverages a public
blockchain (e.g. Bitcoin) and digital signatures to exchange meta-
data such that RansomClave will only unseal VKprv after the ran-
som has been paid.
Security. From the attacker’s perspective, the advantage of this
approach is its security, since the attacker can independently check
a ransom payment exists on the blockchain. The disadvantages
are that it requires the attacker to maintain an online presence to
monitor the blockchain, increasing operational overhead, and it
requires the victim to actually trust the attacker to release the key
after a payment has been made (as with current ransomware). We
note that, unlike the next two schemes proposed later in this section,
a variant of this scheme could potentially be used in combination
with existing (non SGX-based) hybrid encryption ransomware.
Overview. In this scheme, the victim is required to first make a
ransom payment on the Blockchain that contains the following
metadata in the transaction: AKpub , VKpub , and a nonce. Addition-
ally, RansomClave derives a bitcoin wallet address based on the
AKpub embedded in it and generates a random nonce unique to the
RansomClave enclave with high probability. The nonce is used as
input to a cryptographic hash function digitally signed later on
the attacker’s machine once the attacker notices the ransom pay-
ment. (AKprv , AKpub) key pair is generated/stored on the attacker’s
machine while (VKpub, VKprv ) is generated inside an enclave and
stored (VKprv as sealed) on the victim’s machine. The victim next
1In all these schemes, for simplicity, we assume that, once the private key has been
released, the victim is able to decrypt the files autonomously, e.g. by using a decryptor
that takes as input the private key and that is part of RansomClave or provided by
the attacker independently.
makes a ransom payment through Bitcoin [32]. Once the attacker
notices a new payment is on the blockchain, he creates a new
Bitcoin transaction providing some uniquely identifiable piece of
metadata, such as the nonce signed using (AKprv ). RansomClave
validates the authenticity and integrity of this data using the em-
bedded AKpub . If the verification is successful, the encrypted VKprv
is unsealed and released to the victim.
Key Release Steps. The blockchain and digital signature payment
verification scheme is illustrated in Figure 3. We next describe the
steps involved in detail:
• The victim follows the payment instructions ( 1○) found on the
ransom note (which also contains the bitcoin wallet address
and the nonce) and deposits the requested amount of bitcoin
into the newly generated wallet address ( 2○). The victim also
includes additional metadata consisting of the AKpub, VKpub,
and nonce into the blockchain transaction using an OP_RETURN
opcode ( 3○)2. The nonce is generated and used along with VKpub
to give the attack a unique identification number. This is essential
as it ensures another victim cannot use a previously obtained
signed message hash from the attacker to trick the enclave into
unsealing the AKprv . OP_RETURN is an instruction in the Bitcoin
scripting language that allows users to attach metadata to a
transaction and save it on the blockchain. It is used to allow the
victim and the attacker to exchange metadata required to instruct
the enclave to unseal the VKprv .
• The attacker periodically monitors the blockchain ledger for
the AKpub in transaction metadata using a payment verification
program. This program searches for the OP_RETURNS opcode in
an output’s scriptPubKey3 ( 4○).
• When a transaction containing AKpub is found and the payment
is verified, the attacker employs a cryptography library to cre-
ate a message hash using the SHA-256 hash of the metadata
provided by the victim ( 5○). The hash is then encrypted with
AKprv ( 6○) using the standard RSA signature algorithm to obtain
the signature (the RSA encrypted message hash). This process
cryptographically binds the signed hash with the AKprv , thus
allowing RansomClave to verify the signature using the embed-
ded AKpub . A new transaction is uploaded on to the blockchain
containing the signed hash and VKpub ( 7○).
• The victim periodically searches for new transactions contain-
ing the VKpub (e.g. on blockchain explorer websites, such as
blockchain.com) as per instructions provided in the ransom note.
Once a transaction is found, the victim downloads the signed
hash and submits it to RansomClave along with the original
metadata consisting of AKpub , VKpub and 𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒 ( 8○).
• RansomClave performs an ECALL ( 9○) to enter the enclave
which computes a hash of the original metadata. The algorithm
then decrypts the message signature with the public key ex-
ponent of AKpub to obtain the hash computed by the attacker.
The two hashes are compared and if they match, RansomClave
considers the signature valid. RansomClave then unseals and
releases VKprv to the victim.
2We assume the victim is provided with detailed instructions to do so or uses an
automated tool to perform the necessary payment steps autonomously and easily.













































Figure 3: Key Release Scheme #1: Blockchain with Online Attacker Payment Verification Diagram
6.2 Enclave SPV Client
To eliminate the attacker’s online presence, we next propose a fully
autonomous and offline attacker (trustless) solution that uses a Sim-
plified Payment Verification (SPV) client inside the enclave to verify
ransom payments on the blockchain. In this scheme, RansomClave
is deployed with a lightweight blockchain client embedded in it.
This allows RansomClave to successfully verify the victim’s pay-
ment on the blockchain and release VKprv without inputs from the
attacker.
Security. The main advantage of this scheme is that it is fully au-
tonomous. This reduces operational overhead for the attacker, who
no longer needs to maintain an online presence. More importantly,
full autonomy means the victim only needs to trust4 the enclave
code, whose behaviour post-payment can be verified up front us-
ing attestation. This is a very attractive property for the attacker
potentially, since it can increase the chances of infected victims
paying the ransom. On the downside, this scheme has arguably
weaker security. In fact, enclave interactions with a blockchain are
potentially vulnerable to man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks [34].
Since the victim has full control over the enclave’s network connec-
tivity, it can impersonate the blockchain to trick the enclave into
accepting fake blocks. However, mining plausible fake blocks still
incurs an economic cost for the victim5. As we will show, in many
cases it is practical for the attacker to increase this cost such that it
is cheaper for the victim to pay the ransom.
Overview. Currently, there are two primary methods of validating
the blockchain as a client: full nodes and SPV clients. A full node
stores a copy of the entire blockchain with all the transactions, from
the genesis block to the most recently discovered block. In contrast,
4We define trust as a utility function where we express implicit trust by paying would
be an expectation that the victim receives something in return, i.e. the decryption key.
5The estimated cost of mining a Bitcoin block in 2018 was between $2k-$20k depending
on the cost of electricity, e.g. see: https://www.marketwatch.com/story/heres-how-
much-it-costs-to-mine-a-single-bitcoin-in-your-country-2018-03-06.
SPV clients can check if particular transactions are included in a
block through block headers only (80 bytes per block) and a Merkle
tree rather than downloading the entire block [3, 11].
Our second RansomClave key release scheme embeds an SPV
Client inside the enclave, together with an embedded hash of the
most recent stable block at the time the attacker creates themalware.
The SPV client inside the enclave then requests full nodes to supply
it with the headers of all blocks since the block corresponding to
the embedded hash, in addition to a Merkle path for the transaction
containing the ransom payment. Once the SPV client is satisfied
the payment has been made, the enclave releases VKprv to the
victim. Although full nodes usually give stronger security than
SPV clients, for RansomClave this is not the case. Since the victim
has full control over the attacker’s network connectivity, it can
mine a new block on top of the current longest Bitcoin chain with
a fake transaction containing a supposed ransom payment. The
victim must simply execute the standard Bitcoin proof-of-work
mining algorithm to find a suitable nonce value. Even if the malware
contains a full node, the hash of the genesis block, and the most
recent block at the time the malware is created, the enclave cannot
distinguish subsequent blocks mined by the victim from blocks on
the real Bitcoin blockchain. RansomClave therefore avoids the
additional storage and synchronisation overhead of a full node
using an SPV client.
Depending on the size of the ransom, it may be cheaper for
the victim to mine a fake block than pay the ransom. As a counter-
measure, the attacker can require the victim to provide a valid chain
with n additional blocks mined on top of the block containing the
ransom payment transaction. The victim would then need to mine a
fake chain of length n, linearly increasing the cost to fake a ransom
payment. However, this mitigation would also require “honest”
victims to wait for n blocks after their payment has been made,
and thus may not be practical for very large ransoms if timely key
release is important. In this strategy, the attacker’s bitcoin address
is embedded in the RansomClave binary. Additionally, the victim
must include the unique nonce generated by the enclave into the
bitcoin transaction. RansomClave will use this metadata to verify
the uniqueness of the transaction prior to unsealing the AKprv .
Key Release Steps. As shown in Figure 4, RansomClave executes
the SPV client inside an enclave which in turn connects to a full
Bitcoin node. We next describe the steps in detail: (i) after Ran-
somClave receives the payment transaction from the victim ( 1○),
it loads the sealed victim’s wallet address into enclave and estab-
lishes a TCP connection ( 2○) to the full Bitcoin node. (ii) the SPV
client sends a getblock message ( 3○) to request a list of blockchain
headers from the current block number and hash embedded in Ran-
somClave when the attacker created it. (iii) the full node checks
transactions and sends a merkleblock message ( 4○), which com-
prises of block headers of the blocks and the Merkle path of the
matched transaction. (iv) the SPV client ( 5○) uses the merkleblock
to verify that the ransom payment transaction is included in the
blockchain and has more than six confirmations. If the verification

























Figure 4: Key Release Scheme #2: Enclave SPV Payment
Client Verification Diagram (a revised version from [20])
6.3 Blockchain Explorer Client
To further improve the security of the SPV client scheme, we pro-
pose an alternative autonomous key release scheme that uses a
third-party blockchain explorer service6. Blockchain explorer ser-
vices allow clients to retrieve transaction(s) relating to a particular
bitcoin address over a secure HTTPS channel.
Security. This approach provides security against straightforward
MitM attacks. To subvert it, the victimmust convince the blockchain
explorer service to provide fake data to the enclave (or pressure law
enforcement to force them). Even if this is possible, the attacker
can combine this scheme with the previous SPV client scheme such
that the victim must still pay the cost required to mine plausible
fake blocks. One downside of this approach is that it introduces
an additional dependency on a third party service. If this becomes
6For example, Blockchain.com provides an explorer API at
https://www.blockchain.com/api.
unavailable for any reason post-infection, even an “honest” victim
will no longer be able to retrieve the decryption key VKprv from
the enclave.
Key Release Steps. In this scheme, when RansomClave is exe-
cuted, the enclave initiates a TLS connection with the Blockchain
explorer API server. We describe the steps in detail: (i) Once the TLS
Handshake is complete, the server’s digital certificate is retrieved
along with information about the Certificate Authority (CA) that
issued it. The digital certificate contains the public key and the
identity of the owner. Additionally, it is signed by the CA using its
private master key. This allows the enclave to use a pre-seeded store
of SSL certificates authorities’ public keys embedded in the binary
to verify integrity and authenticity of the retrieved certificate. (ii)
Once a secure channel has been established, the enclave makes
an API call to the Blockchain explorer API server for transactions
and block data relating to the attacker’s Bitcoin addresses. (iii) The
server sends relevant data to the enclave. If a valid transaction
with a minimum of six confirmations is found, then the enclave
releases the VKprv . Six confirmations is generally accepted for most
transactions as it represents enough security to ensure the validity
of the transaction.
7 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
We present a proof-of-concept implementation of RansomClave
design. Our prototype implementation operates similarly to Wan-
naCry but executes inside an Intel SGX enclave. The reactive variant
of RansomClave is composed of 2,600 SLOC, while for the proac-
tive variant, the SGX-LKL library OS is also needed as well as code
restructuring for symmetric key generation.
Algorithm 1: Setup and Execution of RansomClave










VKpub ← 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐾𝑒𝑦 ();
for file f in getImportantFiles() do
EKv (f ) ← generateSymKey() ;
encrF ← encrypt (f , EKv (f ) );
encrSymKey ← encrypt (EKv (f ) ,VKpub);




Experimental Setup.. All our experiments were performed on
Intel® Dual-Core™ i5-7360U CPU with 4GB of RAM, and 3 CPU
cores at 2.30GHz. Our system ran Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS 64-bit within
VirtualBox 6.0. In addition, we performed our tests using Intel SGX
drivers [25], the Intel SGX SDK [24], and the open-source SGX-LKL
library OS [35].
RansomClave.Algorithm 1 describes theRansomClave program
in reactive variant. In detail, when the malware is executed, its first
task is to initiate the enclave using a launch token and get the buffer
sizes required by the untrusted code to store the VKpub and sealed
VKprv . Once the memory is allocated, the untrusted code makes an
ECALL by calling the enclaveGenKey function to generate (VKprv ,
VKpub) pair using 256-bit Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). The
enclave seals VKprv using the data seal key and returns both keys
to the untrusted code. When the keys are in place, RansomClave
initiates the encryption process by calling the getImportanFiles
function, which starts searching for the victim’s files in specified
targeted folders and encrypting each file f using a new EKv (f ) .
Each EKv (f ) is then encrypted using VKpub before it is permanently
deleted. The encryption process is repeated until there are no new
files to encrypt. Finally, a ransom note is displayed to the victim
containing instructions on how to make the payment and unseal
VKprv to restore the files.
Algorithm 2: Enclave Launch and Key Release of Ransom-
Clave
Result: Launch enclave, initiate TLS connection, get
transaction data, verify and unseal VKprv
Input: 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑣𝑒𝐼𝑑 , ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒 , 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑁𝑢𝑚,𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑟 , 𝑡𝑥𝐼𝑑 ;
𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛 ← 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑒𝑦 ();
if loadEnclave(launchToken, enclaveId) then
SSL_Library_init ();
ctx ← initCTX ();
server ← openConnection(hostName, portNum);
ssl ← sslNew(ctx);
𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑆𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑑 (𝑠𝑠𝑙, 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟 );
if (sslConnect(ssl) == FAIL) then
abort ();
else
txResult ← getTx (hostName,walletAddr, txId);





Proactive RansomClave. We extend our proof-of-concept Ran-
somClave to support the proactive variant using the open-source
SGX-LKL library OS [35], which is designed to run existing un-
modified Linux binaries inside enclaves. SGX-LKL executes the
ransomware sample to perform cryptographic operations on sam-
ple victim data (provided as part of a Linux disk image) inside an
enclave. The in-enclave SGX-LKL library OS provides transparent
system calls (e.g. file and network I/O), user-level threading, and sig-
nal handling. Reactive RansomClave is categorised as native since
its cryptographic operations are performed in user-space similar to
traditional ransomware operation.
BlockchainExplorerClient.Algorithm 2 describes the blockchain
explorer services with offline attacker schemewe have implemented
within RansomClave. When RansomClave is executed, the victim
is asked to provide a bitcoin address along with the transaction
identifier (txId) of the ransom payment. An enclave is then loaded
using a launch token followed by an OCALL to initiate a TLS hand-
shake with the Blockchain API server. The getTxmessage is sent to
the server to request a data block linked to txId and wallet address
(walletAddr) along with number of confirmations. If a valid trans-
action with at least six confirmations is received, then the enclave
executes the unseal function to unseal and release VKprv .
Operational and Performance Evaluation. We have tested the
proof-of-concept RansomClave operational capabilities on four
different SGX-enabled VMs, each configured to store different types
of files as to mimic user’s and organizational scenarios. In each run,
RansomClave encrypted 200 files whose size ranged from few KB
up to 250MB. After the encrypting operations, the user was shown
a ransom note requesting a symbolic sum, and we performed the

























Figure 5: Cryptographic operation performance evaluation
Our performance evaluation compares the speed of cryptographic
operations for the two RansomClave variants proposed in this
paper, reactive (native) and proactive (enclave). Figure 5 shows
the measurement of cryptographic operations on files whose size
ranges from 15MB to 250MB: we can see that these operations in
the enclave take longer to complete when compared to the native
ransomware. An average of 12.76% overhead for the encryption
operation and 34.05% in decryption operation is observed when
the ransomware sample is executed inside an enclave. Additionally,
the results also revealed that the decryption operation is slower for
both the native and enclave ransomware. This could be potentially
due to the implementation of AES in Cipher Block Chaining mode,
which uses cipher in the inverse direction, thus resulting in slower
decryption timings [48]. However, it is possible to achieve faster
decryption on a system that supports parallel decryption, although
this may result in using more memory due to loading multiple
copies of the encrypted block.
Key Capture.We tested RansomClave’s key management against
popular memory forensics tools and techniques, such as Dumpit,
Volatility, and PayBreak [31]. Our experiments confirm it is possible
to extract keys from memory for a reactive variant that generates
symmetric keys outside of an enclave. However, it is not feasible
for the proactive variant as all keys are generated inside an enclave.
8 DISCUSSION
RansomClave Pre-Infection Mitigations. Several methods can
be applied to reduce RansomClave’s attack surface. In particular,
given that the main focus of RansomClave is to provide robust key
management, some existing mitigations against ransomware based
on static analysis or in-memory analysis techniques [5, 8, 17, 29, 31,
42, 43, 55] can detect RansomClave. For instance, binary inspection
of an unknown program could detect cyptographic calls [22] or
file calls [56]. In addition, as shown in [7, 50], it is also possible to
detect unknown malicious code and functions in enclave binaries
using existing static analysis techniques, since SGX by default does
not provide code confidentiality. Furthermore, a malicious program
can only issue system calls through the host application: as such,
software monitoring system calls could stop the malware before
it can take any destructive actions. A user could also disable SGX
functionality in the system BIOS when not in use, although this is
undesirable. Lastly, system privilege is needed to create an enclave.
As such a strict policy could be enforced on the end user machine
to stop RansomClave execution.
Launch Control. Intel SGX’s launch control whitelist provides
a mechanism to prevent wide-scale abuse of enclaves on systems
where it is straightforward to gain admin privileges. However it
requires Intel to proactively monitor and revoke whitelisted keys
that have been compromised or abused, and for systems to reg-
ularly update their local copy of the whitelist. We note however
that openness concerns around launch control have hindered up-
stream support for SGX in the Linux kernel. The recent availability
of Flexible Launch Control on newer versions of SGX mitigates
some of these openness concerns, but shifts the burden for securely
managing the whitelist to the system owner, and potentially re-
quires a secure-boot mechanism to protect the whitelist against
an attacker with admin privileges. To the best of our knowledge,
other enclave technologies (e.g. AMD SEV) do not have a hardware
vendor-enforced launch control whitelist.
RansomClave Post-Infection Mitigations. As shown by [13,
44], SGX is vulnerable to software-based side-channel attacks that,
according to Intel, can only be prevented by the developers them-
selves7, i.e., Intel does not consider side channel attacks as part
of the SGX threat model. Hence, victims infected with Ransom-
Clave could potentially extract ransomware’s keys from inside of
an enclave via side-channel attacks.
Extensions.We have considered RansomClave targeting multi-
ple, distinct users. In an enterprise scenario, rather than creating
enclaves on multiple hosts, RansomClave can set up a single inter-
nal SGX server to manage all the cryptographic keys of the infected
hosts on a local network. In this instance, a clear advantage from
an attacker’s perspective is that it simplifies the key management,
particularly if some hosts do not have SGX support. However, rely-
ing on a single machine to generate all keys could impact untrusted
7E.g., see: https://software.intel.com/content/www/us/en/develop/articles/intel-sgx-
and-side-channels.html
code’s ability to promptly encrypt victim’s files since the encryp-
tion key is not immediately available. Additionally, it also leads to
a single point of failure for the attack.
Ethical Considerations. This research has ethical concerns of
dual use research as our findings could improve the key manage-
ment of modern ransomware. However, by commenting on the
theoretical risks of future SGX-based ransomware, we preemptively
foster discussions on the possible risks of SGX-empowered malware
that might have been underestimated [51]. We also omit implemen-
tation details to develop a fully-fledged SGX-based ransomware
and key release scheme – this would require cyber-criminals to
perform a non-trivial integration task – and outline mitigation
improvements.
9 RELATEDWORK
SGX Malware SGX-ROP is the first attack to enable an enclave
malware to stealthily control its host application independent of
the enclave API [51]. SGX-ROP uses an Intel Transactional Synchro-
nisation Extensions-based technique to construct a write-anything-
anywhere primitive and a memory-disclosure primitive from inside
an enclave. SGX-ROP can bypass ASLR, stack canaries, and address
sanitiser, to run ROP gadgets in the host context, enabling practical
enclave malware. However it does not evaluate the implications for
key release. Marshalek discusses the possibility of ransomware run-
ning inside enclaves, but does not evaluate performance overhead
or the implications for key release[38].
Enclave Interactionwith Blockchain.Authors [21] proposes us-
ing blockchain to implement one-time programs via cryptographic
obfuscation techniques. [27] expands on this idea by proposing a
protocol that uses an enclave to facilitate secure state management
for randomised multi-step computations. It also introduces the con-
cept of combining the enclave with public ledgers to condition a
program execution on the publication of particular messages on
the ledger, and describes a practical set of applications leverag-
ing this protocol. In contrast, our research provides an in-depth
analysis of the trade-off and security advantage between different
blockchain-enabled key release schemes.
SGX-based Key Management Frameworks. Some research ef-
forts [10, 46] explore the application of SGX in a cloud environ-
ment to minimise the disclosure of sensitive data to a third-party
hosting and providing the cloud services. Authors [46] proposes
key-management frameworks for data-centric networking where
an SGX-based key server, which supports remote attestation and
key sealing, generates and manages data encryption and decryp-
tion keys. Neither work addresses the implications of SGX for ran-
somware key management.
10 CONCLUSION
Based on an analysis of key management schemes of existing ran-
somware, we observe that most ransomware strains either generate
keys on the victim’s machine, thus leaving them vulnerable to mem-
ory key extraction techniques, or require contact with a C2 server.
However, recent work has raised the spectre of future enclave-
enhanced malware that can avoid such mitigations using emerging
support for hardware-enforced secure enclaves. Given the dam-
age ransomware causes, it is important to understand what new
advantages such ransomware might provide to attackers.
We implement a proof-of-concept calledRansomClave to demon-
strate the practicality of such ransomware emerging in the near
future. Our evaluation shows that RansomClave can provide a prac-
tical key management solution with minimal overhead to address
known weaknesses in existing ransomware strains. RansomClave
also raises the possibility of autonomous blockchain-based key re-
lease schemes that no longer require victims to trust the attacker
to release decryption keys or the attacker to maintain an online
presence, potentially increasing attacker profitability. We show
however that a variety of mitigation techniques are still possible
for a security-aware victim.
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